Ethical Justifications for Voluntary Active Euthanasia by Spina, Bernadette
Richmond Public Interest Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 6
1-1-1998
Ethical Justifications for Voluntary Active
Euthanasia
Bernadette Spina
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Richmond Public Interest Law Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bernadette Spina, Ethical Justifications for Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 3 Rich. J.L. & Pub. Int. 71 (1998).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/6
ETHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR VOLUNTARY
ACTIVE EUTHANASIA
Bernadette Spina*
The topic of euthanasia gives rise to a host of ethical questions
including those regarding the quality of life, beneficence, and the
responsibilities of physicians toward their patients. While there are many
kinds of cases in which euthanasia may be considered, such as those
involving severely handicapped newborns and patients with debilitating
but not fatal conditions, this paper focuses on the situation of late-state
terminally ill patients who are suffering and want active euthanasia as an
option for ending their pain. This paper explains why, under such
circumstances, voluntary active euthanasia may be ethically justified.
Active and passive euthanasia are generally thought of as two separate
phenomena, with the first involving the commission of an act that brings
about death, and the second involving the omission of treatment that
would prolong life.47' In addition to active and passive euthanasia, there is
a third approach to euthanasia some view as a separate and distinct
category. This approach is referred to as physician-assisted suicide.
Physician-assisted suicide is similar to active euthanasia in that it involves
a direct act intended to cause a patient's death. In active euthanasia, a
doctor performs the act intended to cause death, while in physician-
assisted suicide, the patient performs the final act.
ACTIVE EUTHANASIA: SUICIDE OR HOMICIDE?
One of the primary concerns about active euthanasia is that it involves
a direct act by a person other than the patient. This being true, opponents
to active euthanasia view voluntary euthanasia as murder rather than as
suicide. Particular controversy exists over the issue of euthanasia in health
care settings where doctors help consenting patients to die. Rather than
being viewed as murder, however, proponents of euthanasia describe it as
"suicide through the agency of another." 472
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"[J]ust as one can commit a homicide or murder through the agency of
another, so one can commit suicide through the agency of another."473 It
can be argued that suicide occurs whenever a person intends to die,
regardless of whether he performs the suicidal act himself or has another
perform it for him.47 4 Three conditions must be met for an act to be
defined as a suicide.475 First, "[t]he action must, with reasonable certainty,
lead to the death of the person engaging in it."476 Second, "it must be
known to the actor that his death would be a virtual certainty were he to
engage in that act."477 Third, "[t]he actor must engage in that action for the
express purpose of bringing about his own death., 478 According to this
definition then, voluntary active euthanasia, which satisfies all three of
these conditions, qualifies as suicide, and should not be considered a form
of murder.
NONMALEFICENCE
Another, more complex, issue raised by the question of euthanasia in a
health care setting is the question as to exactly what a physician's
responsibility is toward a patient who wants to die. In effect, the question
becomes that of what creates the doctor's duty to help such a patient end
his life. An important ethical principle that, applied to biomedical ethics,
can be used to justify a doctor's role in euthanasia is nonmaleficence.
The principle of nonmaleficence asserts that "a doctor ought not to
inflict evil or harm or bring his patients into the risk of evil or harm."479
Because of the way technology has advanced the practice of medicine,
doctors today are able to provide a host of life-prolonging treatments that
were previously unimaginable. Using these treatments, however, is not
always the best way to serve the patient's interests. For example, using
respirators and feeding tubes, physicians have the ability to keep patients
in persistent vegetative state (PVS) alive for an indefinite amount of time.
Many treatments available through modem medical technology
successfully sustain life, but in fact reduce the quality of life led by the
patient without ultimately providing a cure. Modem medical technology,
turns "prolongation of life into prolongation of dying."480 Patients who
receive treatments that take a tremendous physical toll upon them,
473 Id.
4 7 4 Id. at 22.
475 EIKE-HENNER W. LUGE, THE PRACTICE OF DEATH 103 (1975).
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treatments which neither adequately combat the pain of their conditions
nor provide a cure, simply endure a prolonged period of pain and
suffering. Similarly, patients who decide to withdraw such treatment but
who do not have the option of euthanasia are left to die in perhaps even
more excruciating pain because of the extra toll that the combined effects
of their illnesses and past treatments take upon them. Thus, medical
interventions that prolong life, either right up to the time of death or to a
point where the patient is left to suffer in a horribly decrepit state, clearly
do the patient more harm than good. In both cases, the doctor is in a
position to end the patient's suffering, but instead prolongs it, thereby
causing more harm to the patient. While one view of the principle of
nonmaleficence calls for doctors to preserve their patients' lives regardless
of the quality of those lives, another view holds that the medical
interventions cause the true harm to the patient through prolonged or more
intense suffering.
481
BENEFICENCE
Another principle justifying voluntary active euthanasia is
beneficence, the complement of nonmaleficence. Beneficence requires a
doctor to act in ways that best promote the welfare of his patients.
4 82
However, there is controversy over what courses of action a doctor should
take to properly fulfill this duty. While some assert that beneficence
requires a doctor to preserve life no matter what the cost, others argue that
a patient's interests are best served by a doctor who respects the patient's
autonomy, is sensitive to the pain he is suffering, and is willing to take
action to end that pain. In the case of a terminally ill patient, suffering
uncontrollable pain and asking for an end to his life, it seems that the most
helpful act would be to end his life in a merciful way. In such a case, death
is imminent, and the doctor has two choices remaining: let the disease take
its course or end the patient's life. While the first option achieves nothing
except for prolonging the patient's suffering and allowing him a painful
death, the second clearly fulfills the doctor's obligation of beneficence by
acting to end the patient's pain and making his inevitable death a little
easier.
THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH
The principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence provide important
perspectives from which to view the physician's role in euthanasia. They
481 See DAVID C. THOMASMA & GLENN C. GRABER, EUTHANASIA: TOWARD AN ETHICAL
AND SOCIAL POLICY 3 (1990).4 82 See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
259 (1994).
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show how, in certain situations, ending a patient's life is the best thing that
a doctor can do to help that patient. Still, "[s]ome people find it especially
difficult to accept the idea of physicians engaging in active euthanasia.
Doctors, they remind us, are dedicated to protecting and preserving life...
.Thus we should not expect them to kill, regardless of whatever might be
right for the rest of us." 483 That is to say that some people see mercy
killing as actually being "incompatible" with a doctor's role.484 One reason
for this feeling may be that people see doctors as having pledged to only
preserve life when they took the Hippocratic Oath.
485
The Hippocratic Oath does not contain any specific statement obliging
doctors to preserve life at all costs.486 The Oath does, however, provide
expressions of both beneficence and nonmaleficence: "I will use treatment
to help the sick according to my ability and judgment, but I will never use
it to injure or wrong them."487 A statement like this is in no way a
commitment to prolong life when, in some circumstances, helping to bring
a terminally ill patient's life to a faster and less painful end is the best
thing that a doctor can do to "help the sick" and not "injure or wrong
them."488 The Oath is subject to much interpretation, especially when one
considers the time and context in which it was written. The opening
statement, "I swear by Apollo Physician and Asclepius and Hygieia and
Panaceia. . . .," demonstrates that the Oath cannot be taken in a literal
sense. 489 In addition, it would hardly be appropriate for a doctor today to
be bound by any set of rules written without a conception of the problems
faced in the practice of modem medicine.
490
QUALITY OF LIFE
Physicians who practice active euthanasia may offend opponents of
the practice who believe that human life is sacred and killing is morally
wrong. 491 These absolutes are simplistic and ignore the complex issues
that arise when a patient is irredeemably ill and would rather die than
continue suffering. When a patient reaches a point where his physical
condition keeps him from deriving pleasure from anything around him (or
in the case of persistent vegetative state, from experiencing anything
483 JAMES RACHELS, THE END OF LIFE: THE MORALITY OF EUTHANASIA 118 (1986).
484 Id. at 121.
485 O. RUTH RUSSELL, FREEDOM TO DIE: MORAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF EUTHANASIA
220 (1975).486 Id. at 221.
487 See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 12, at 189.
488 RUSSELL, supra note 15.
489 Hippocrates, The Hippocratic Oath, in ANCIENT MEDICINE: SELECTED PAPERS OF
LUDWIG EDELSTEIN 6 (0. Tempkins & C.L. Tempkins, eds., 1967).
490 RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 221-22.
491 1d. at 117-19.
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around him), it becomes appropriate to evaluate the patient's life, and to
decide if he has anything to gain by continuing to live and suffer.
Proponents of this view accept that "death is not an absolute evil to be
avoided at all costs and in all circumstances, and life is not an absolute
good to be maintained and preserved at all costs. " 492 Accepting this idea is
a necessary first step toward understanding the feelings of a suffering,
terminally ill patient who sees no value in living out the rest of his illness.
"Because human life is sacred, a person should not be degraded by being
required to endure prolonged, useless suffering . ..while waiting for
physiological death." 4 93 In addition, it is important to note that we live in a
society where, in situations such as war, capital punishment, and self-
defense, we are willing to overlook both the sacred value of human life
and our supposed moral aversion to killing.
494
MORALITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT
One attempt to "try to preserve the categorical injunction against
killing" while at the same time recognizing that a patient's interests may
best be served otherwise is through the principle of "double effect."49
This principle holds that "one may perform an action with a bad effect--
for instance, the death of a person--provided one foresees but does not
intend that bad effect; one must be doing the act to achieve a different,
good effect. .. Therefore, according to this principle, it is acceptable
for a doctor to give a patient drugs if the intention is to relieve pain, even
though he knows that the drugs will shorten the patient's life.4 97 Thus,
such an action is considered morally acceptable because the intention is
not specifically to bring about the patient's death. One can seriously
question, however, whether there is a moral difference between giving a
patient drugs specifically to cause his death and giving a patient drugs to
relieve his pain knowing that to do so will cause his death. "What is true
of morals is true of law. There is no legal difference between desiring or
intending a consequence as following from your conduct, and persisting in
your conduct with a knowledge that the consequence will inevitably
follow from it, though not desiring that consequence. '" 498 Taking
responsibility for one's actions means taking responsibility for any
foreseeable consequences of those actions. A doctor cannot shirk moral or
legal responsibility for such consequences by saying that bringing them
492 [d.
493 WENNBERG, supra note 2, at 77.
494 See, e.g., RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 217.
495 MARGARET P. BATTIN, THE LEAST WORST DEATH: ESSAYS IN BIOETHICS ON THE END
OF LIFE 17 (1994).
496 [d.
497 See, e.g., RUSSELL, supra note 16, at 18.498 Id. at 126 (citing Dr. Glanville Williams in THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL
LIFE).
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about was not the primary intention of his actions. It is inconsistent,
therefore, for a doctor practicing active euthanasia to be seen as morally
inferior to a colleague who is doing exactly the same thing while merely
claiming he has different intentions.
PLAYING GOD
Opponents to active euthanasia claim that it is "playing God."
Presumably this means that by interfering with the natural progression of a
patient's condition, a doctor practicing euthanasia is exercising a certain
power over life and death that only God should have. This accusation is
countered, however, by the simple fact that a doctor interferes with the
natural progression of a patient's disease every time he provides him with
treatment.4 99 When a doctor saves a patient's life, it is not thought of as
"playing God," although presumably that doctor is exercising the same
power over life that a doctor practicing euthanasia is exercising over
death.
JUSTICE
In addition to moral concerns involving the power over life and death,
there is another principle that some have asserted as a justification for
euthanasia. This principle, the principle of justice, can be thought of as
expressing "fair, equitable, and appropriate treatment in light of what is
due or owed to persons." 500 In regard to existing laws against euthanasia,
many people see it as unjust that a patient who is in pain is denied the
chance for an easy death, and made to suffer longer because of legal
constraints.501 Laws prohibiting euthanasia can be viewed as unjust to
family members, who must endure a longer period of emotional and
financial strain, and to doctors, who may see relieving the patient's pain as
a primary duty that they are being kept from performing.
50 2
Some opponents might argue that a patient who truly wanted to die
would find a way to end his life, with or without the help of a doctor. This
assumption, however, is problematic in ways that hearken back to the
issue of justice. Many patients in advanced stages of a terminal illness are
physically incapable of performing the actions necessary to end their lives.
It is unjust to deny such patients the right to end their suffering simply
because they cannot perform the necessary actions. Even patients who are
499 WENNBERG, supra note 2, at 93.
500 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 12, at 327.
501 JERRY B. WILSON, DEATH BY DECISION: THE MEDICAL, MORAL, AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF EUTHANASIA 55-56 (1975).
502 Id.
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physically capable of performing the actions may require a doctor's
instructions to perform them correctly. Without those instructions, the
patient's suicide attempt may not only fail, but may in fact result in
additional harm and suffering. Patients may also fear the legal
consequences for family members and friends who might be present when
they kill themselves. That fear leaves them with no choice but to carry out
their suicide alone and die without anyone nearby for comfort. Therefore,
maintaining the illegal status of euthanasia breeds injustice.
DANGERS OF LEGALIZATION
Opponents of euthanasia often discuss the possible dangers that can
result from legalization. One such danger is found among patients whose
illnesses put them into a state of depression. It is thought they might make
rash decisions to end their lives, and that emotional doctors and family
members might comply without proper caution.50 3 Proponents of
euthanasia, however, can point to just such a situation to advocate
legalization of euthanasia. A euthanasia law could limit the practice to
hospital settings and provide safeguards such as requiring at least two
physicians to certify a patient's lack of prospects for recovery.50 4 While
the decision to end one's life still ultimately rests with the individual,
legalizing euthanasia would not obligate physicians to assist in suicide
unless the patient is competent, death is imminent, and more conventional
means of alleviating pain have failed. "[Physician]-assisted suicide makes
sense for a limited number of Americans, those who are terminally ill and
who are competent enough to request their own death. 50 5 This type of
cautious exercise of euthanasia is the kind that should be provided for in
an appropriate euthanasia law. Having such a law would provide patients
with more protection and additional options than they get from current
practices of euthanasia performed in secret. Unregulated secret suicides
pose a real danger to patients in terms of the possibility that their own
emotional states, as well as those of their assistants, will lead to irrational
acts.
Another potential danger perceived by euthanasia opponents is the
possibility of incorrect diagnosis. 50 6 Of course this possibility cannot be
completely discounted. It would be irresponsible to say that diagnoses are
perfectly accurate all of the time. However, as mentioned above, many
argue that active euthanasia should be considered as a last resort when the
patient has reached a point where death is imminent, and pain has become
503 Id. at 58.
504 RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 225.
505 Arthur Caplan, Can High Court Rule Over Death?, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 12,
1996, at A7.
506 RACHELS, supra note 13, at 165-66.
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uncontrollable by conventional means. At that point, it should be more
than clear that the patient has no hope of recovery. Again, by having a law
that allows euthanasia, physicians could be involved in the patient's
decision, offer him alternatives, and possibly avoid the chance that a
misdiagnosed patient would choose to end his life prematurely. In
addition, the possibility that mistakes will be made exists in every form of
killing that is currently sanctioned by our society. Innocent people have
been executed, civilians have been killed during war, and people have
been killed in self-defense when in reality they posed no threat. The
possibility of making mistakes does not make these practices illegal and
should not make the practice of euthanasia illegal.
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE
Another argument against legalization is one that is referred to as the
"slippery slope" argument. This argument asserts "that although some acts
of euthanasia may be morally permissible..., to allow them to occur will
set a logical precedent for, or will causally result in, consequences that are
morally repugnant." 50 7 The idea behind the slippery slope is that "if
euthanasia were legally permitted, it would lead to a general decline in
respect for human life."50 8 For example, opponents of euthanasia often cite
the involuntary euthanasia program that was implemented in Nazi
Germany as having led directly to the emergence of concentration
camps. 50 9 This application of the slippery slope argument can be
countered, however, with the assertion that the Nazi euthanasia program
did not, in fact, cause the Holocaust, but was an initial product of the same
"political, social, and psychological factors of the Nazi period "that also
led to concentration camps. Also, the Nazi euthanasia program was
involuntary. Involuntary euthanasia occurs against a patient's will or
without his consent, and can only be classified as murder. Any law
allowing euthanasia would only be applicable to competent patients who
voluntarily choose to die.
Still, opponents voice the concern that if euthanasia were to be
legalized, it could be abused and forced on people against their will. Three
main sources of potential abuse are suggested. 511 The first source is
families who shoulder the financial and emotional burden of a relative's
prolonged illness and may try to "manipulate or pressure patients into
choosing death. 5 12 A second source is physicians who may use euthanasia
507 BATTIN, supra note 25, at 115-16.
508 RACHELS, supra note 36, at 170-71.
509 BATTIN, supra note 25, at 116.5 10 id.
511 Id. at 167.
512 Id. at 168.
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"as the solution for every treatment problem they cannot solve" or to
"cover their medical mistakes." 513 Physicians might also pressure patients
into euthanasia by convincing them that they have no viable options in
terms of treatment or pain control.514 A third source is health care
institutions that may, to contain costs, limit a patient's treatment
choices. 515 While the possibility of such abuse is a serious concern,
advocates do not feel that keeping euthanasia illegal is the appropriate
solution. 5 16 By keeping euthanasia illegal, we may avoid the abuses that
could possibly result, but we also deny the benefits of euthanasia to
patients who currently suffer from terminal illnesses.517 The slippery slope
argument "usually takes the form of an appeal to the welfare or rights of
those who would become victims of later, unjustified practices ....
however,.., no account is taken of the welfare or rights of those who are
to be denied the benefits of this practice." 518 Therefore, the best way to
resolve this issue is to allow euthanasia but to control the practice so as to
prevent abuse.
REGULATING EUTHANASIA
There are several ways to regulate the practice of euthanasia. First,
psychological evaluation, counseling, and a waiting period must be
required for the patient to ensure that he is competent, has based his
decision on sufficient information, was given enough time to decide, and
was not improperly influenced by anyone during this time.519 Second, the
opinions of several professionals must be obtained in the physical and
psychological evaluation of the patient. Third, every instance of
euthanasia must be documented as far as the patient's medical condition,
alternatives to euthanasia presented to the patient, and various aspects of
the patient's decision process including "a clear expression of the patient's
choice. 5 20 Another possible means of regulation is through a federal
agency, either one already in existence or one designed specifically to
address issues of euthanasia, where reports on practices of euthanasia
could be sent for review.521 Such an agency could conduct "retroactive
inspection on a broad scale of patterns of performance of euthanasia" to
take place in order to help show any "patterns of euthanasia abuse" that
may already exist.
522
513 Id.
5 14 id.
515 Id. at 171.
5 1 6 Id. at 118.
5 17 Id. at 119.
5 18
id.
5 19 See id. at 173-76.
520 Id. at 177.
521 Id.
522 Id. at 178.
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While it is true that no regulation can guarantee that legalized
euthanasia will always be morally employed, it is also true that any law
runs the risk of being abused.523 Legalizing and regulating euthanasia will
provide greater protection for patients than the current practice of
euthanasia performed in secret. A law that permits but regulates
euthanasia will provide the benefits of the practice to patients who seek it
while at the same time imposing restrictions to prevent a slide down the
slippery slope.
CONCLUSION
Advances in medical technology provide many options for prolonging
a terminally ill patient's life, often beyond the point at which he is able to
derive value from that life or even live free from pain. For such a patient,
voluntary active euthanasia is ethically justifiable. If a patient is
competent, autonomy dictates that he should have the right to choose
when and how he will die. In addition, the principle of justice asserts that
it is unjust to deny such patients the opportunity to end their pain. Doctors
have responsibilities of beneficence and nonmaleficence toward their
patients and both are served in the practice of voluntary active euthanasia.
Legalizing this form of euthanasia and controlling its practice with
regulations provides the best compromise between opponents interested in
protecting against abuses and terminally ill patients who could benefit
from the practice by ending their suffering. For such patients, death is not
a tragedy, but a blessing.
523 Id. at 173.
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